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Globalisation and development in technology have advanced terrorism to reach a 
broader target audience. Especially focussing at the international co-operation 
strategies and combined social networks, terrorist activities have an direct- and 
indirect effect on private households, international commerce and local governments. 
Security institutions and state organisations use various combinations of counter-
terrorism measures, that are mostly social-, political-, or financial in nature. 
Nevertheless it is argued that fighting terrorism goes into conflict with basic human 
rights and promotes national violence. As a consequence, this thesis is an attempt to 
investigate in more depth the impacts of terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies 
based on the fundamental extremists emergence theories.  !
The first chapter analyses main motivations and possible reasons behind terrorist 
activities with the regime types of targeted and source countries. The results from 
leader- and followers theory, radicalisation process and economic environment model 
of dictatorship were the cornerstones for the second chapter, that examines an 
spectrum of micro- and macro level impacts. The results revealed, that fragile politics 
and absent legal frameworks for national security promote economic downturn and 
terrorism. Thereby information asymmetry and countries individual risk-assessment 
should frame the basics of counter-terrorism matrix.
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1 Introduction 
National- and international terrorism is a constantly changing phenomenon. It has an 
impact on almost every nation around the world. Due to innovations in public finance, 
to international co-operation across boarders and especially due to their expenditure 
strategies, the terrorist groups improved as well. Today their planning, their 
contemporary methods and their goals are systematised and have a broader target 
audience. !
Specialists for international relations and economics see terrorism ether as strategic 
choice of crime in order to pursue specific goals or as the product of collective 
rationality, which explains some main characteristics and nature of terrorist attacks. It 
is also argued that the face of terrorism has changed since beginning of 19th century 
from anti-political unions to religious organisations in the present circumstances. The 
occurrence of globalisation, that led isolated human societies to Europe and other 
developed countries, set in motion the transition of terrorism. The old strategies and 
means of terror have been replaced by modern technology, deliberate infrastructure 
and large financial assets. The proneness toward groups or individuals categorising 
themselves according to political views, religion or society sections is non-avertable, 
especially in developed countries, due to basic human rights and freedom of speech. In 
this part the opinions and practices differ: radicalised groups and limited participation 
rights in transparent governance are linked to growing global risk of extremist 
behaviour. Apart from that, alternative preconceived ideas support the fact, that states 
with higher number of minority groups would possibly reduce, instead of expand 
terrorist activities. !
During recent years, terrorism — its effect and cause, has become an important 
subject for research. Furthermore, it presents a dominant concern for international 
security. In contrast, the complex nature of terrorism has an effect to various other 
fields of social sciences such as economics, politics and culture. The nexus of difficult 
issues involving terrorism, has lead to an increased vulnerability in attacked countries. !
Based on academic literature and classical terrorist groups emergence theories, this 
thesis is predominantly an attempt to understand in more depth how continuous 
targeting of extremist groups through counter-terrorism strategies can generate 
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societal instability in different governmental regimes. The alternative insights, other 
social-, political- and geopolitical components take into account firstly consequences of 
terrorism to private households and international commerce. Secondly it analyses how 
counter-terrorism policies come into conflict with local authorities and common 
standards of human rights. !
The current state of unstable Middle East countries, the spillover effect on terrorist 
groups and emergence of other extreme groupings indicate, that the responses to 
terrorism are inaccurate. Lessons from the past and alternative explanations, 
considering political regime, normal decision-making process and external impacts as 
the sources of terrorism, lead to the need of more long-term suggestions. Various 
characteristics, such as changing geopolitical background and nature of terrorist 
groups, asymmetric information flows in socio-economic environment and complexities 
of counter terrorism measures modulate the two pillar structure of this thesis.  !
The first part is based on leaders and followers theory resolving issues about extremist 
group emergence in different governmental regimes. The discussion regarding 
correlation of terrorism and state failure lead to abstruse system of nations risk on 
micro- and macro levels. The insistent priority of dealing with terrorism has affected 
domestic and foreign policy strategies and is the central theme in second part of the 
thesis. Furthermore governments attempts of stabilisation and state building influence 
foreign affairs, international commerce, private households and collide with basic 
human rights. Up to this point a great amount of critique has been added to causes of 
terrorism and especially the aftermath of their action together with impacts to the 
environment. A case study about struggles with terrorism, autocratic regime, foreign 
economic sanctioning and new reforms in Iraq will conclude the issues discussed in 
second part. Nevertheless, terrorism in different forms keeps repeating itself one 
decade after another. For that reason theories beyond mainstream are presented in 
this thesis that take a more long term peace-building objective.!
!
!!!!!
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2 Literature Review !
Terrorism is unquestionably not a recent occurrence in society. It has been around as a 
mayor threat to governments since ancient times. The definition of terrorism varies 
throughout academic literature, yet a commonly used explanation is given by Schmid 
(1983a: 111. In Richards 2014: 213-236), that terrorism is a method of combat, in 
which random or symbolic victims become targets of violence. Later on, he determines 
the purpose of terrorism through the target: „The victimisation of the target is 
considered extra normal by most observers… which in turn creates an audience beyond 
the target of terror… The purpose of terrorism is either to disable the target of terror in 
order to produce disorientation and compliance, or to mobilise secondary targets of 
demand or targets of attention“ (Schmid 2011b: 39).   !
Three characteristics of terrorism run through various academic studies: individuals or 
groupings undertaking violent activities, a common goal or changes for the society and 
means to achieve these goals. It is important to determine the reasons why groups 
emerge in certain areas to begin with, and whether there is a connection between 
terrorism and the economic conditions of environment. Interpreting irrationality and 
complexity behind extremist behaviour, Hoffman (2006a: 18) argues, that terrorism is 
politically motivated violence against non-combats and justified through unfeasible 
conditions or governmental systems by such groups. Meaning, that the political system 
in some nation might be too complex to achieve authority through peaceful and 
appropriate ways.  !
The literature recognises few factors that affect terrorist nature and furthermore the 
magnitude of their activity. For instance Laitin and Shapiro (2007: 209) evaluate mostly 
degree of corruption, the regime type of sender and target nations, the level of 
terrorism interference in daily life, the sources of investments and capital flows. 
Political terrorists and minority groups experience lack of authority in society and are 
left with no other choice than become violent (Shiffman 2006: 15; Marcus 2007: 302). 
Same as Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which was censured by Turkish political 
system, justify using violence with increase of political power. This shows a connection 
between ethic minorities and terrorism towards governmental regime. !
In contrast, a new civilisation conflict is emerging due the increasing amount of muslim 
population in mainly Western-European countries (Tibi, 2009). In 1950 the number of 
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muslim inhabitants in Europe was 800,000, where Houssain Kettani (2009: 7) 
estimates this figure to reach 48 million in Europe by 2020. The problem is not the 
growing muslim population in Europe, rather the segregation in the European 
community. That would build parallel societies as a result of unsuccessful migration. 
Based on examination of terrorism literature, the most studies are focussed on the 
financial and economical damage terrorist attacks have created in different countries. 
Classical terrorism theories are based on past events observations and aggregate 
economic behaviour. At this point it is important to analyse in depth the environment 
where terrorist groups emerge, why certain individuals tend to join extremist groups 
and the change in public order through terrorism. !
Throughout a considerable volume of distinctive literature, the attack of September 11, 
2001 in United States (U.S.) has particular quality and comprehensive role of being a 
key date in terrorist history. This incident and following violent attacks in other 
countries, described also „war on terror“, set in motion a rapid growth of terrorism 
literature. From that moment onwards terrorism, as a research area has gained decent 
weight of interest. Before 1970, in comparison to recent writings, rather limited 
amount of research was put together. Terrorism as an investigation area became more 
relevant in 1969, after David Rapoport constructed a series of academic lectures about 
threats to national security. The current framework of terror- and counter-terrorism 
literature is a correlation with economic journals, books, academic magazines and 
other documentations of over thousands of authors. Yet again, different terrorist 
groups have been active for more extensive period of time, however the scenarios with 
violent attacks came into public light in early 90’s. !
After the assault in 2001, the literature has advanced with more outlook to developed 
terrorism in global environment. The range of topics, that had existence only at best 
on theoretical level, have been experimented and improved. With the globalisation 
effect, according to Hirschmann (in Suder 2004: 217) two (three) types of situations 
have been recognised: firstly, the internalisation of domestic politics through 
cooperation and integration; and second, the economic internationalisation through 
globalisation. The third cause of internalisation has been more concealed, whereas the 
consequences are appearing over time. The internationalisation and global movement 
of society, including terrorist organisations is additionally one aspect to consider for this 
paper. !
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With the significant amount of literature available and emerging developed 
consequences previously mentioned, this thesis is designed to combine different 
methodology, strategies and outcome about the nature of terrorist acts; the utility cost 
of terrorism on micro- and macro level; and integrate these results to reactions from 
economic policy and counter-terrorism strategies on a case study basis. This kind of 
research is unique and relevant for the present global economic situation. Furthermore, 
the complex nature of counter-terrorism strategies is a combination of different 
elements (politics, economics, culture, business), that all combined lead towards facing 
the new economical- and geopolitical scenario. 
 
In order to examine the relevant terrorism-, counter-terrorism and global economic 
literature, a systematic order is needed to separate methodology and theory from 
previous strategies, and statements. The first chapter is a combination of leaders-and-
followers theory by Wintrobe (2006), radicalisation process by Cragin (2009) and 
economic environment models by Shiffman (2006), that analyse the measurement of 
terrorist activity and the nature of terrorist groups. Even when terrorist attacks occur 
infrequently (Enders and Sandler 1995; 2002), the total amount of assaults is irregular 
across countries. The change in terrorist motivations has lead to using more violence 
and increased attack probability during economic downturn, as argued by Enders and 
Sandler (2000). Gabriele G.S. Suder's (2004) work on modern global terrorism in the 
international environment analyses these statements in international business 
environment in connection to geo-political risk. !
Wintrobe (2006; 2007) proposes a theory on „extreme-tradeoffs“, which is based on 
non-traditional explanations for terrorism. Some other terrorist group identity theories 
(Hardin 1995) and group diversity studies (Berman 2003) are interesting, nevertheless 
this section will concentrate on rationality and government models for counter-
terrorism measures. Laitin and Shapiro (2007) evaluate power of local authorities, the 
importance of democratic ideologies and counter-terrorism strategy as success factors 
in war of terrorism. A comparison between the nature of terrorist organisations and 
theoretical Economic Tools Security Spectrum (Shiffman 2006: 2) show, that 
discontentment with the regime results only periodically in terrorist attacks. !
The second chapter about utility cost of terrorism and certain sectors of activity is 
based on terrorism and international business conceptual foundations (Czinkota, Knight 
and Liesch 2004). Becker and Rubinstein (2004) and Sunstein (2003) estimate the 
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rationality of risk and take the utility cost of terrorism far beyond the direct damage. 
The negative impact of fear and risk have an effect on international business, 
economics and global politics. What are these causes on micro- and macro economics 
and how the cost of terrorism can be connected to volatility and growth? The theory is 
then explained by using general- and business risk assessment tool, which 
distinguishes aggregate output on national- and international levels. !
International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated the direct damage done by terrorist 
attacks to be relatively low and short-term. Yet the U.S. budget for combating 
terrorism overseas, which also includes spending abroad for $11.4 billion, amounted in 
2004 to $52.7 billion in total (U.S. OMB: 9-10, 14). The direct damage and counter-
terrorism strategies have an impact on different economic sectors. Analysation 
according micro and macro levels explains the consequences in more accurate manner. 
Terrorism effects on private households defines „non-rational“ evaluation of risk, 
whereby utility cost goes beyond immediate damage. The psychological factors, that 
follow terrorist acts change consumer behaviour and overall consumption in relation to 
savings. The micro level analysis sets under examination specific industries, such as 
tourism and insurance sector. Risk assessment on private companies focusses on 
alteration of capital markets and government spending. The macro level analyses direct 
effect of terrorist attacks on global environment, especially government policies, 
strengthened legislation and interaction with human rights. This type of investigation 
can become overly broad, for that reason the macro-level analysis is focussed on 
issues, such as contradictions between single market policies and global free trade 
policies, international legislation and national security. !
The last part demonstrates through a case study how terrorist groups emerge in 
society and what has been done in order to protect one nation to lose it’s boundaries. 
The war on terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies bring previous two building- 
blocks together by examining which policies have been applied against Iraq. In this 
case several academical studies refer to two basic opinions in simplified terms: „the 
stick or carrot“ strategy (Frey 2004). It is important to take into consideration, that it is 
impossible to terminate terrorism form the society, due to power and information 
asymmetry in addition with constant development of both parties. The „stick“ option 
uses force, in the means of civilised democratic society, or „carrot“ alternative, by using 
the opportunity cost and making the attack less attractive to terrorists. Bassam Tibi 
(2009), Professor of International Relations in Göttingen, refers in to the „different 
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nature“ of terrorists, that is caused by non- integration to European countries. He also 
offers a solution for arab minority groups to be accepted into developed societies by 
tolerating different religions, which according to Lee (1988) is a dominant strategy at 
the expense of other nations. The third main part of the research also examines the 
effect of alternative counter-terrorism strategies, such as economic sanctions, proactive 
policies and limitation of terrorist funding. The linkages between a nations legal and 
political institutions and vulnerability lead to the final statement, that counter terrorism 
strategy should be a portfolio consisting of economic-, financial- and political tools, 
rather than single policies. The compatible mix of such tools are put together by cross 
examining the main literature about economic instruments of security policy (Shifmann 
2006: 101; Prasad 2014), finance and control of states and trans-national terrorism 
(Kaul and Conceicão 2006). !
!
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!
!
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3 The Nature of Terrorist Groups !
Environments where terrorists operate are very important on grounds of the strategy 
and distribution networks they use. Blomberg, Brock and Hess (2007) have discovered, 
that wealthier countries with free market policies and democratic regimes are 
frequently targeted; as poor countries with other regime types and closed economies 
are mostly the foundation source of extremist groups. Taking this statement farther, 
Yusaf Akbar (in Suder G. S., 2004: 25-43) declares global economic inequality as one 
of the main causes of terrorism, in addition to poverty being the ground floor for 
terrorism. Extremist groups consist of leaders and followers, which emerge due to 
changes in environment. A leader, who makes decisions surrounded by conditions of 
scarcity, motivations, resources and limitations can be analysed through the nature of 
men: „… to truck, barter and trade one object to another“ (Adam Smith in Muir and 
Widger 2009). Trade and decision-making processes vary throughout political regimes 
and are important to those, that choose economic tools for security policy in 
international affairs. For that purpose arranging the methods and nature of terrorist 
organisations in certain political system, the targeted nations policy makers can 
understand and predict economic- and financial instruments that would change 
terrorist activity. Shiffman (2004: 2) has established the building blocks of anti-
terrorism strategies that governments have used previously (Table 1). !
!
On the basis are the economic actors or terrorist groups, who use different strategies 
and level of violence to reach their goals. Depending on the government regime 
authorities and security organisations choose counter terrorism measures, that they 
think would be the most appropriate. Even with the most acceptable strategy terrorism 
is still present and having a spill-over effect in some regions. For that reasons recent 
perspective is to use a mix of anti terrorism combat methods, rather than single 
policies. 
Table 1. Building Blocks of Security Policy. Shiffman 2004.
Sanctions Trade Finance Aid Terrorist 
Financing 
International Law
Authocracy Democracy
Economic Actor
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3.1 Leaders and Followers Theory !
Nearly all European countries and western world share strong democratic views, Asia 
and Middle-East have a mixture of theocratic-, federal- or islamic republic. Some Arab 
countries are republics with elected deputies, nonetheless under intense autocratic 
influence (Syria) or monarchies (amongst others: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, 
Morocco). The world has come through different stages of democratic and autocratic 
developments, which makes adaption of economic policies more difficult and yet 
creates incentives to examine the national security policy tools for counter terrorism 
purposes.  !
Previous studies about leadership and organisational ecology emphasise the unique 
organisational characteristics of terrorist groups and especially the importance of their 
top leaders. Individuals that make certain decisions are rational, because these 
decisions are for their own benefits and obtained by using the best possible technique. 
Even when extremist people have views outside the mainstream, terrorists act in 
accordance with the same assumption - to gain something with the best feasible way 
(Wintrobe 2006: 1). Most leaders trade authority against solidarity with followers, who 
are thereby used as tools to reach goals. A separate evaluation of terrorist groups 
leaders and followers will explain how use of violence can be explained through 
rationality and why terrorist groups use extreme methods to achieve their goals. 
Understanding the dynamics in terrorist groups, the environment they operate and the 
goals they want to achieve will identify most suitable counter terrorism measures. !
3.1.1 The Leaders Rational Choice of Violence !
The difference between democratic politics to extremist methods are that the latest 
carrie more risk. The factors of violence and illegal action, which are more related to 
extremist methods will go into conflict with law and thereby have a negative response 
from authorities. Becker (1968: 169) and authors such as Sandler and Enders (2002) 
compare the choice between extremist methods and terror with the level of having a 
criminal career over a legal one. Often groups with terroristic beliefs are more likely to 
adopt violent methods and terror in order to achieve a change in the system (Wintrobe 
2006: 2). Table 2 shows an example of different governmental regimes, where leaders 
use divergent methods to reach an ultimate goal. 
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In this example nationalist society lacks homeland, in communist society governments 
goal is to control national means of production and Islamic Fundamentalists are 
thriving towards a sole Islamic State. One possibility to achieve these goals is to use 
stimulus over time with linked events, such as going through voting procedure, legal 
demonstrations, civil disobedience towards more aggressive means, namely violence 
on property. !
!
In any case, the opposition group tries to move towards the goal and increases 
pressure. Before the end result is reached some level of power needs to be attained 
first, which is in conflict with opposing groups and resulting the indivisibility effect 
between intermediate goal and ultimate goal (Table 2). As all examples follow the 
same theory one graph about Islamic Fundamentalism is presented (Figure 1). 
 
  
Figure 1. Islamic Fundamentalism. Wintrobe 2006. 
Table 2. Political organisations intermediate- and ultimative goal. Wintrobe 1998.
Intermediate Goal Ultimative Goal
Communism Control over national production Communist society
Nationalism Control over territory Nationhood
Islamic Fundamentalism 
(Figure 1)
Muslim domination Islamic State (IS)
Absence of foreign domination
Islamic Society (IS)
    D
E
Indivisibility
!11
The horizontal axis represents absence of foreign secular domination and vertical axis 
(D) is indivisibility level, the degree of violent pressure needed for the ultimate goal. At 
point E opposition still has to accept foreign authority, which doesn’t exclude the 
possibility of tolerating diminutive Islamic State (IS) in muslim countries. Nevertheless 
D remarks the point, where enough foreign authority has been removed to maximise 
the possibilities for end goal IS. !
Wintrobe (1998: 824-827) describes terrorist groups as organisations with production 
function. He simplifies his theory and considers as „products“ only moderate pressure 
(M) or extreme incidence of violence (I). He argues that either or can be used or a 
mixture of both, with a fixed amount of labour (L), capital (K) and organisational ca-
pacity (O). Applying these components to pressure equations (Equation 1) and terrorist 
groups total fixed stock (Equation 2) he concludes that a varying mixture of violent and 
non-violent methods is necessary to reach end goals. 
Equation 1. Different levels of pressure. Wintrobe 1998. 
Moderate violence: M = M (LM, KM, OM);  Extreme violence: I = I (LI, KI, OI) 
Equation 2. Fixed stock. Wintrobe 1998. 
Labour: L = LM + LI;   Capital: K = KM+ KI;  Capacity: O = OI + OM 
 
Figure 2. Relationship between end goal and pressure. Wintrobe 2006.  !
Figure 2 displays respectively the variables as vertical axis measures the level of end 
goal (Z) and on horizontal axis the various degrees on pressure, either moderate (M) 
or extreme pressure (I). Furthermore the correlation of two possible outcomes, success 
Pressure/ Terror
End goal of the  
group (Z)
Z0+g
Z0+m
Z0-f
Z0
I1I0 M
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and failure can be identified. For instance, by success high level of extreme pressure is 
used (I1) culminating with end goal Z0+g (g representing indivisibility). In the case of 
failure, the result might be Z0, a mutual agreement or a solution. !
As violent pressure carries more risk, the group leader can also be captured and 
eliminated, then the production curve is in Z0-f (f shows the counter terrorism 
sanctions effect on the groups goals) and on horizontal axis in 0. The outcome of 
implementing moderate level of pressure (M) results with Z0 + m, which is however 
more acceptable than failure. Terror curve in Figure 2 explains also why terrorist 
groups tend to use more often violence. When they would choose I0 over I1, some 
degree of control would be achieved, yet not enough to be satisfied. Additionally the 
risk factor would be lower. As the increasing returns of Z0+g is much higher than that 
from failure in Z0-f, they would rather go for maximised violence and thereby also 
higher risk. The relationship between success and failure proves, that terrorism is 
possibly a rational choice. !
The level of risk is shown in Figure 3, whether the choice of using violence I/M or not 
is also the choice of the leader. The figure exposes a shift from EZ0 to EZ1, meaning 
that the leader can choose between a combination of methods. Furthermore it 
demonstrates the dissatisfaction with the results and that the leader wishes to achieve 
more. On the horizontal axis is the extent of moderate and extreme methods σ²(I/M). 
Vertical axis represents the goal level and the expected utility of the group leader E(Z).  
Figure 3. Leaders turn to extremist ideology. Wintrobe 2006. 
E(Z) E0
EU1
σ²0 σ²1
EZ1
EU0
σ²(I/M)
EZ0
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Figure 3 represents simply the correlation of increased risk and more violent methods 
leading to equilibrium of EZ curve. Assumedly the leader will adjust the decision-mak-
ing process to the environmental changes. Thereby the rationality of that person de-
termines the indivisibility spectrum of g/m ratio (area between Z0+g and Z0+m) as 
shown in Figure 2. As a result terrorist leaders choice to use violence depends on two 
deterrence variables: !
1) in the case of failure the leader will lose its position and all the power; 
2) the effect of foreign sanctions to the groups goals !
Increasing both variables might decrease using more extreme methods, yet they are 
limited from the practical side of view. Becker (1968: 169) argues, that when the 
leader or members of terrorist groups are captured and the punishments in that 
country are too high, it will affect the support of community. Secondly, for instance 
capital punishments might be preferred by legal authorities, rather than sentencing the 
respondent to death, because it diminishes the effect of error (Anderoni 1995: 1-21). 
Escriba-Folch (University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona) investigated methods dictators use 
to stay in power and proved, that using force or terror reduces the likelihood for 
leaders to loose position. Besides autocratic regimes become vulnerable under 
international pressure for economic liberalisation. !
3.1.2 The Followers Dynamics between Authority and Sovereignty !
Despite some assumptions terrorist group structures being hierarchical (Kurth Corin 
2006: 7-48), new researches show a rather different reality. Ressler (2006) compares 
the terrorist hierarchy analysis to Social Network Analysis (SNA)  with asymmetric 1
information flows due to globalisation. Depending on the size of the organisation and 
political category, Victoroff (2012: 3-42) has re-evaluated the responsibility functions of 
terrorist groups into roles as shown in Table 3. Even though the positions are self-
elected and the strategies are violent in nature, some links explain the reasons people 
become supporters of extremist groups. Normally terrorist organisations consist of 
 The basics of Social Network Analysis (SNA) states that individual concerns are linked to com1 -
plex networks, that compose additionally the structure for natural events, organisations and 
social processes. Network Science Organisation, 2015. From sparsely to densely connected 
networks. [online] Available at:<http://www.network-science.org/highly-connected-society-
dense-social-complex-networks.html> [Accessed 09 March 2015].
!14
hundreds of members that suffer from social differences and inter-nation antagonism.  2
Yet countries that tend to state sponsored violence and political terror with human 
right abuses have less chances to protect its citizens. It is also argued that people join 
terrorist organisations to seek protection from the state (Global Terrorism Index Report 
2014: 3). In either case the leader is linked to a strategically positioned goal which he 
accomplishes through the support of the followers. !
[Table 3 HERE in Appendix 1 (a)] !
Followers become a part of the group to obtain protection and sovereignty, yet through 
a change where they adopt certain perspectives identical to the superior. Fleischacker 
(2013) indicates, that the dual philosophy of human nature has an „impartial 
spectator“ that consist of motivations for survival, to some extent morality and the 
need for approval of fellow man. With dissimilarities in temperament, the approval of 
approbation creates conflicts and the level of proximity becomes a determinant 
element to balance out disagreements. Nevertheless the crucial element in terrorist 
groups is the common belief in something exceptional. Islam as religion is wide spread 
globally amongst moslems. Thereby islamism, a mix of political and religious views is 
used for example by al-Qa’ida (ALQ) terrorist group that allows slaughter and global 
terror (Black 2001: 348). According to a number of political studies, the main 
characteristics in terrorist groups are trust in their ideas and strong need for solidarity. 
Individuals, tolerating violence and terrorist activity join these type of organisations 
with belief, that they can attain solidarity at the lowest price. !
The followers of terrorist groups make through a radicalisation process in three phases 
(Cragin 2009: 3). In the first phase (Table 4) individual becomes aware of terrorist 
groups and some respond to it. It is unclear, why certain type of people are more 
prone to terrorist propaganda than others, however the reasons are mostly linked to 
frustration or somewhat previous experience with extremist movements (Tumelty 
2005: 1-4). It is argued that the first phase occurs due to terrorist advertisements 
online, which is then continuously used for communication internally and with the rest 
of the world (Kaplan 2009). The second phase takes place on more personal level and 
 According to U.S. Department of State Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) has 100-200 members. Unit2 -
ed State Government, 2015. Country Reports on Terrorism 2011 Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist 
Organisations. [online] Available at:<http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195553.htm#im> 
[Accessed 26 February 2015].
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requires contact between individuals and one member of terrorist group. In this point 
the leader needs to parallel the individuals expectations to the group goals. The third 
phrase of radicalisation process is a complex set of components which lead to 
commitment. !
!
Results based on Table 4 and research about extremist groups (Black 2001: 348; 
Hoffman 1998b: 172; Ricolfi 2005 in Wintrobe 2006: 178) find the most important 
characteristics to be high level of solidarity with a combination of extreme beliefs, 
which are positively related to individual conformity. As no two individuals are identical 
and thereby do not hold the same degree of norms, the high level of solidarity needs 
to be reached separately (Sherif 1961: 183). The terrorist follower model assumes, 
that both autonomy and solidarity are positive, then follower utility (U) to the leader 
equals the level of autonomy (A) and solidarity (S) that he gets from the group. 
 
!
!
Figure 4. Followers behaviour and solidarity multiplier. Wintrobe 2006. 
!
Figure 4 illustrates this connection with a starting endowment point e0, which ends in 
equilibrium E1. When the e0 curve reaches E1, the follower has adopted the views of 
Table 4. Radicalisation process. Cragin 2009.
1) Availability and influence. Environmental factors make certain individuals more prone to 
appeals from terrorist groups. 
2) Recruitment and introduction occurs after initial contact between individuals and a member 
of terrorist group.
3) Commitment to action of the leader of terrorist activity.
A
S
e0
E0
E1
U1
U0
S0 S1
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the leader, gained solidarity S1 and prepared to go along with the terrorist activities. 
Another phenomena takes places on the same curve, yet requires time to occur. The e0 
curve moves to the right and takes a deeper slope, as the follower desires more 
solidarity. The sudden increase in solidarity is triggered by revenge or tragic events 
(Ricolfi 2005: 169-195). This also describes the „corner“ situation, where an individual 
chooses a total obedience to terrorism A=0 and S=S1. Thereby characteristics of a 
follower are identical with leader’s, and the utility curve U0 becomes U1, which is also 
the utility of the leader. The follower has given up all the authority and is totally under 
the leaders control. When A=0, the curve represents increasing returns of solidarity 
and larger chances that followers will be resistant to outside information. !
The results from an interview with thirty-five prisoned Middle-Eastern Extremists from 
Hamas, Izz a-Din, al-Qassam to Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and in addition to non-
religious groupings such as Fatah  will sum up leader-follower theory. The findings 3
were remarkable, as 30% of the prisoners came from religious terrorist families and 
15% of the prisoners had family members in radical involvements. The main influence 
for these individuals joining terrorist groups was the already existing knowledge about 
terrorist activities and need for social status. Their individual identities were equivalent 
to the groups beliefs and complied with the leaders motives (Post, Sprinzak and Denny 
2003: 171-184). !
3.2 Problems in Autocracy !
Findings on terrorism literature show twofold images about terrorism in autocratic and 
democratic regimes. However, terrorist groups are likely to emerge in authoritarian 
regimes with the side effects of minimal safety and social welfare for local citizens 
(Aksoy, Carter, Wright 2011: 1). The methods how autocratic leaders rule are 
important in two ways: firstly, in addition to leader—follower theory, it helps to 
understand the purposes of terrorist attacks to targeted countries and secondly 
enlighten strategies how targeted countries respond to these attacks. The insights into 
this topic form also the tactics for economic development, policy debates over 
sanctioning and other counter terrorism measures.  
 The complete explanation of these terrorist groups are given by The Meir Amit Intelligence 3
and Terrorism Information Centre. The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre, 
2015. Information about terrorism groups. [online] Available at:<http://www.terrorism-in-
fo.org.il/en/index.aspx> [Accessed 09 March 2015].
!17
Autocratic regimes combine high level of domination by the leader with high level of 
loyalty by followers (Hume cited in Cohon and Edward 2004). This is achieved by 
maximising domination and minimising investments to the local economy. As all 
countries differ, so do the policies applied in these regimes. Shiffman (2006: 29) 
specifies economy in autocratic regimes as a general state of poverty with zero 
domestic investment and non-existent civil organisations, that would contribute to 
health care or education. He also illustrates a strategy about the dictator, who has total 
control of economy and expenditures. In order to stay in power, the dictator needs 
security (Escriba-Folch 2010). One possibility is to invest in public services (G), that 
increases national income (C) and security services (S). Variables C and S are 
important, because they are paid from income tax on domestic earnings and a tax on 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Under those circumstances the investments are 
divided into government spending (Ig) and FDI into properties or venture capital (Id).  !
In this model, the dictator receives complete benefits from Ig, for being the end link 
for capital flows. The private entrepreneur receives a net payment in Id and the 
dictator obtains direct and indirect taxation flows. Nevertheless, it is necessary to 
predict how economy works under autocratic regime. In an closed economy, gross 
domestic product (GDP) equals government spending (G) times the average marginal 
tax rate (t).  !
!
Equations in Table 5 relay on the basic GDP calculations to the net income of the 
dictator (Y). The findings show, that Y consist of tax revenues (T) minus government 
spending (C) and minus the cost of staying in power (S) i. e. security costs and bribes. 
Table 5. Economic environment model of dictatorship. Shiffman 2006.
Q = q(G,t) GDP = government Spending x Average Marginal Tax Rate
T= tQ Tax revenue = Average Marginal Tax Rate x GDP
C = c(G)
Total costs = Total Government Spending * Total GDP function
S = s(Q)
Y = T — C — S Dictators net Income = Tax Revenues — Government Spending — 
Security Cost
Y = t*q(G,t) — c(G) — s(q (G,t) where s(q (G,t) = Q
t* is maximising rate of taxation; G* is maximising level of government spending
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Dictators cost function relays on the variables C and S, which carry large impact on the 
total net income. Additionally the level of tax (T) depends on the net income 
maximising percentage of taxation (t*) and net income through government 
expenditures (G*). In autocratic regimes the leader can act mostly in two possible 
ways: !
1) When the marginal tax rate is zero or near zero government spending (C) and 
security cost (S) would be held constant, the dictators net income (Y) would 
increase. When the tax rate is then increased to 100% or near that, the net income 
(Y) would fall. Olson (1993: 567-568) estimates an decrease in peoples motivation 
level with higher taxes, because they would assume, that any wealth they create 
would be taken from them. Workers would not accumulate assets and economy 
would not grow. Thereby point t* represents an equilibrium, where the dictator can 
maximise its net income with average marginal tax rate: 
Tax rate <0%; tax rate >100% (t*) !
2) In situation, when the government spending in infrastructure and public necessities 
is zero or close to zero, the net income is expected to fall. That produces poor 
production, thereby degenerated economy. In both cases, increasing variables t* 
and G* up to a rate will multiply dictators net income, after that it will give 
negative returns. Furthermore the dictator would only gain from domestic 
tranquility and production of goods. However the public spending will occur only, 
when the provision of these goods increase taxable income (Olson 1993: 567-568):  
Government spending <0%; government spending >0% (G*) !
In regimes with closed economies the leader can effectively manipulate domestic 
commercial environment and the citizens with FDI (Id), that goes through local 
government. The foreign investor has no control over the wages paid for the workers 
nor the tax rate. As assumed, the dictator does not hold political legitimacy, rather a 
monopolistic power to control the wealth, thereby keeps he the wage rate minimalistic. 
With a high tax (T) and very low government investment (Ig) all the benefits flow to 
dictators account (Table 5). In an additional example foreign investments Id are put 
straight to firms, without government interference, they will enlarge the local economy 
and as a result increase GDP. In equation S=s(Q) (where Q is GDP in Table 5) the 
variable S (security cost) will increase and weaken the rulers regime. !
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The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) has constructed a yearly summary of 
Global Terrorism Index (GTI 2014), that watches global occurrence of terrorism and 
the most common action plans since 2000. GTI names top five most terroristic 
countries in the world in 2014 were Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria. 82% 
of all people killed by terrorist activity in 2013 were in these countries (Global 
Terrorism Index Report 2014: 2). To draw an analogy between GTI and other economic 
data, such as corruption, government spending, monetary freedom and market 
freedom amongst these countries for the year 2014, it shows a contrasting picture to 
United States and a world average (Table 6 ). !
[Table 6 HERE in Appendix 1 (b)] 
!
Table 6 exhibits the economic unsuitability and freedom of corruption, lowest in Iraq 
and Afghanistan with 16,0 and 8,0, Syria with 17,0. United States and the rest of the 
world score on freedom from corruption of 73,0 and 41,9 accordingly (The Heritage 
Foundation 2015). As the economic environment model of dictatorship (Table 5) 
demonstrated, government spending is high due to increased need of security for the 
leaders, in Afghanistan 81,2 and in Pakistan 86,1. The government is also interested in 
holding back private sector and production sector to keep GDP low. The economy in 
those countries is highly homogeneous, mostly concerning about oil production (nearly 
95% of government revenue) , which allows the local authorities control the 4
entrepreneurial scene and labour freedom. In addition governments favour certain 
extremist groups, that form political unity or cause revolts against opposition. Due to 
government controls in financial system and banking sector Iraq and Afghanistan share 
no information in open markets section in Table 6. Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria show 
also weak results, with below average world index in trade-, investment- and financial 
freedom. The statistics show somewhat low foreign direct investment (% of GDP 
2013-2014) for Nigeria 1,1%, Iraq 1,2% and Afghanistan 0,3%, yet the ongoing 
political chaos discourages international trade (The World Bank 2015). !!
 In 2010 Iraq oil revenues account for over 75% of GDP and 95% of government revenue.  4
Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2015. Iraq: Transparency Snapshot. [online] Available 
at:<http://www.resourcegovernance.org/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/iraq/trans-
parency-snapshot> [Accessed 10 March 2015].
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3.3 The Role of Democracy !
With ALQ terrorist attack (in New York U.S.) on World Trade Center (WTC) September 
11, 2001  promoting economic freedom and liberal democracy became the main 5
strategy against terrorism (Gwartney and Lawson 2007). In 2002 the White House 
released a new strategic plan, which set the main focus on promoting market 
liberalisation and democratic governmental regimes to non-democratic nations 
(National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House 2002a). 
On June 1, 2004 George W. Bush announced that autocracies and political 
dictatorships, identical to closed economies are the source of terrorism and thereby 
threatening international security (The White House 2004b). In the same year Bush’s 
administration strongly criticised the Hussein regime  in Iraq, identifying it as closed 6
economy and political dictatorship, which promoted terrorism to other nations by 
working with extremist movements. To fight against it, Windsor (2003: 43-58) points 
out the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), that offers support, training and 
assistance to groups and individuals for positive change in 18 countries and contributes 
over $600 million for support, administrated from Washington D.C. (Middle East 
Partnership Initiative 2015). Other promotional methods, such as published documents 
and press releases targeted the world to step up to non-democratic regimes. With an 
direct focus on Iraqi regime, U.S. sponsored local elections for trade development and 
overall economic welfare in Iraq in 2008 (Klein 2004: 48). These strong 
encouragements towards open markets and trade liberalisations have created an 
dualistic conflicting relationship. !
The opinions about whether democratic governance diminishes terrorism on national or 
international level, differ throughout political literature. Nevertheless depending on the 
twofold theories, democratic ideas can hinder terrorism (Muravchik 2001). Free market 
standards can be applied only to certain regions with numerous ethnic groups. 
Authoritarianism, human rights abuse and government controlled economic expansion 
have given rise to very poor living standards, which in turn hinder local citizens to 
 Terrorist grouping al Qaeda attacked World Trade Centre and Pentagon buildings in United 5
States September 11, 2001. 9-11 Commission, 2015. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States. [online] Available at:<http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Re-
port_Exec.htm> [Accessed 10 March 2015].
 United States Department of State fact sheet describes the brutal political regime in Iraq un6 -
der president Saddam Hussein from 16 July 1979 to 9 April 2003. The United States Govern-
ment, 2015. Past Repression and Atrocities by Saddam Hussein's Regime. [online] Available 
at:< http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/19675.htm> [Accessed 10 March 2015].
!21
express their indignation and encourage brutality (Muravchik 2001. In The Weekly 
Standard). Furthermore, public rage and dissatisfaction turn people against local 
authorities. He also rises the problem with government sponsored media, that gives 
ground for conspiracy against U.S. or its allies. As a result of that people turn to 
extremist groups for revenge. On the other hand, some studies looking into the 
relationship between terrorism and government regime claim the opposite. Eubank and 
Weinberg (2001: 155-164) indicate positive correlation between democracy and 
emergence of terrorism. In a dictatorship people have minimalistic rights, whereby in 
democratic countries open society enables objective communication for everyone, 
having no distinction between terrorist or non-terrorist. Thereby democratic regime is 
based on equal rights and protection for every person. !
After an depth investigation James A. Piazza shows a changing association between 
government regimes and international terrorism (International Politics Journal 2008: 
72-91). In total of 153 countries were watched over the period of 1986-2003. One 
dependent variable was chosen based on the quantity of terrorist attacks in a single 
nation for that time frame, which are found in the updated version of Patterns of 
Global Terrorism Report (U.S. State Department 2003). The report measures terrorist 
acts according to the country of happening, not the origin of the perpetrator. 
Additionally four independent variables support the number of terrorist attacks and are 
divided into measurements of political regime and economic freedom. The first two 
variables represent datasets from Freedom House Organisation  and The Polity IV 7
Project  by Centre for Systemic Peace (2014). The following two variables of Economic 8
 Freedom House Organisation was the first U.S. organisation that promotes political and eco7 -
nomical freedom globally. Puddington, A., 2015. Discarding Democracy: A return to the Iron fist? 
[online] Available at:<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2015/discarding-democ-
racy-return-iron-fist#.VQAra1p-86V> [Accessed 11 March 2015].
 The Project IV looks into authority characteristics of states in the world for comparative and 8
quantitative analysis. Centre for Systemic Peace, 2015. Polity Project IV. [online] Available at:< 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html> [Accessed 11 March 2015].
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Policies Index  by Heritage Foundation  are measures for economical liberty. While 9 10
The Heritage Foundation analyses only a certain period between 1995-2003 an 
additional dataset Economic Freedom of the World by Fraser Institute is added for the 
missing information. The complete analysation in International Politics Journal (Piazza 
2008: 72-91) includes in addition control variables such as Human Development Index, 
Population Index and the Geographic Area Index. Other changing measurements 
include regime durability, Repression Capacity Index, State Failure Index and muslim 
majority or plurality in population. All variables and fields of measurements are shown 
in Table 7.  !
[Table 7 HERE in Appendix 1 (c)] !
The results from this study show only a slight correlation. Some factors such as low 
Human Development Index in some countries would result increased level of terrorism 
even without high level of poverty (GTI 2014: 4). The Population Index and 
Geographical Area Index are presumed to be strongly linked to terrorism. Regime 
Durability variable is expected to be a trigger for terroristic act due to political 
instability and tendency for a regime change, as more constant political environments 
are less prone to terrorist attacks and dissatisfaction amongst population (Rotberg 
2002: 85-96). The number of muslim population is added to the analysis on account of 
the expected positive link to terrorism and because policy commentators see the origin 
of terrorism from muslim countries. Especially Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria have been 
under constant observation and main targets for implementing democratic government 
order by the U.S.  !
Table 8 concludes the total of four tests whereby the differences that may occur are 
put in parentheses. The correlation between regime type and terrorism showed only 
positive results in 2 cases and thereby do not support the hypothesis that democratic 
 Economic freedom is measured by The Heritage Foundation and represents the fundamental 9
right of every human to control his or her own labor and property. The research published in 
2015 is based on the data from second half of 2013 and first half of 2014. The Heritage Foun-
dation, 2015. 2015 Index of Economic Freedom. [online] Available at:<http://www.her-
itage.org/index/about> [Accessed 10 March 2015].
 The Heritage Foundation, founded in 1973 is a research and educational institution, that for10 -
mulates and promotes conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, 
limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and national defence. The 
Heritage Foundation, 2015. About Heritage Foundation. [online] Available at:<http://www.her-
itage.org/about> [Accessed 10 March 2015].
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regime reduces terroristic activities (Piazza 2008: 83). In addition the indexes of 
Heritage Foundation and Economic Freedom in the World act as independent variables 
and show no connection to international terrorism. !
 [Table 8 HERE in Appendix 1 (d)] !
Relying on the test results from International Politics Journal (2008: 87) and 
statements from GTI Report (2014: 4) there is no direct evidence that either 
democratic or autocratic regime is affecting terrorism. Instead political stability and 
legitimacy of the state have an impact on wellbeing of its citizens and occurrence of 
state failure. Furthermore Vision of Humanity (2014: 4) has not found any direct 
connection between poverty standards and economic growth to higher terrorism rate. 
Nevertheless trade liberation and open markets related to GDP have a moderate 
interrelation of -0.40, which proves that terrorism has possibly influence on trade 
(Vision of Humanity 2014: 4). This includes other development elements: level of 
education, life expectancy and social welfare. Some academic work show no previous 
religious relatedness to terrorism, yet political dissatisfaction and especially politics 
combined with religious goals have increased considerably since 2000. Furthermore 
countries with majority of muslims are bound to higher risk of terrorism (Kettani 2009: 
7). All of these results show that fragile politics, absent legal frameworks for national 
security and growing government-promoted violence are important to give an 
explanation of emergence and nature of terrorist groups. 
!
!
!!
!
!!!
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4  Utility Cost of Terrorism !
Despite the counter terrorism measures applied by government authorities, the risk of 
terrorism sees a constant increase. Alone in 2013 nearly 10,000 incidents were 
recorded, which resulted deaths of about 18,000 people (Cheung 2014). According to 
academic literature, growth in terrorism started with the U.S. forces entering Iraq for 
support and security purposes (Pace and Jakes 2014). Despite the new Iraqi 
governmental system and U.S. supporting local security, this event encouraged 
different minority groups to emerge and become violent. The opposite effect helped 
terrorist groups such as AQI recruit even more young solders to fight for Islamism. 
Iraq suffered under serious terroristic attacks in 2000 and after Nouri al-Maliki was 
elected in power as prime minister in 2006. After a period of less terroristic activity, in 
2013 the situation took a turn for the worse as from former AQI formed one of the 
wealthiest and lethal terrorist organisations, the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant 
(ISIL). ISIL outlines a shift to latest trends and adoption to the world development, 
making it  outstanding from previous terrorist groups and creating a contemporary 
need for transnational security. !
Advanced patterns in terrorism activity contribute to rearranging principles of global 
social justice. Additionally the counter terrorism measures and policies created to 
protect nations carry risk on micro- and macro economic levels. The scope and velocity 
of that risk is partly responsible for difficulties in counter terrorism strategies. Fighting 
against terrorism in one region has low probability of success due to uncomplicated 
cross-boarder mobility. Simultaneously this has lead to increased need of protectionism 
and security for citizens in countries with high risk of terrorism equally to the target 
nations citizens. Powerful countries such as United States, China, Russia and India 
have an independent permission to react to such circumstances. Even though these 
must act under the United Nations (UN) Article 51 to use military force only for self-
defence or with authorisation by UN Security Council (United Nations 2015). An 
alternative is to form larger entities, such as the European Union (EU) or NATO, 
whereas smaller or fragile countries experience state failure with no ability to 
legislative order and protection of daily crime.  !
With a complex system of global governance the central institutions to fight against 
terrorism are the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), that build up a 
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framework of global legislation. International law protects countries down to the 
individual level and is based on the mutual agreement of International Criminal Court 
(ICC) and UN of holding the highest authority to protect against violence, economic 
threat and environmental danger. As the most risks nowadays are man-made and have 
transnational characteristics, the systematic approach has to take global aim. As a 
paradox, any kind of global economic downturn can cause violence and insecurity also 
on national level. Same as violence and insecurity are the reasons for economic 
vulnerability. If such circumstances in countries, for instance Iraq, Syria and Pakistan 
are not solved, taken into consideration economic protection used for western world, 
the situation might worsen.  !
Following the changing nature of terrorism, the next building blocks for investigating 
security policies are concerned about micro and macro level environment of sender 
countries, which both experience direct and indirect effects. Whether a country is 
targeted by terrorism or is the source of violence, its citizens experience insecurity to 
some extent. Furthermore, by looking into these sources of insecurity and seeing them 
in connection with global risk, the counter terrorism approaches by national states 
must be related to stabilisation and state building. The following chapter analyses how 
terrorist attacks affect national and international economy. !
4.1 Impacts of Terrorism on Micro and Macro level !
Terrorist groupings are not limited to Islamic militants or AQI. Various other minority 
groups, left-wing or right-wing oppositions and religious parties try to make a reform. 
In order to mitigate damage to lowest degree possible academics have tried to 
measure and estimate harm by terrorism on global level. Thereby taking a closer look 
at tree economic performers: households or consumers, the private sector or individual 
businesses and governments. Moreover, any kind of terrorist act has direct and indirect 
effects on different fields of society (Solomon, Russell-Bennett and Previte 2012: 218). 
Indirect causes might result in a long-term action for security purposes, such as 
implementation of new policies and counter terrorism measures. For companies this 
means further limitations. Very often government policies have the opposite effect. 
Instead of hindering terrorist activities, they reach industries that are beyond the 
actual target. That can lead to unpredictable results that favour terrorism in some 
countries. 
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Due to difficulties of valuing human life, the total cost of terrorism varies throughout 
studies. For example, financial cost analysis about attack on the WTC in New York on 
September 9, 2001 range from $35 billion to $109 billion worth damage (Rose and 
Blomberg cited in Erdilek 2011). Other sources give a smaller rage, yet include the loss 
of human life and capital costs to $25 billion to $60 billion, specifying the human life 
loss to $40 billion. In addition to operational costs for eliminating constructional waste 
afterwards reached $11 billion (Navarro and Spence cited in Brück et al. 2001). The 
accumulated estimated costs for public sector were $14 billion, to U.S private sector 
$1,5 billion and $0,7 billion for U.S. federal government (Navarro and Spence cited in 
Brück 2008). Besides methods, that terrorist use for violence have different devastation 
value. For instance bio-weapons, poison or bacteria attack each produce total cost for 
target country up to $26,2 billion accounted for 100,000 deaths (Kaufman, Meltzer and 
Schmid 1997: 83-94 cited in Stewart 2006). A report published by RAND organisation 
in 2011 brings out estimated costs for moderate, severe and nuclear attacks in United 
States (Table 9). !
!
Moderate terrorist attacks cause an $11 billion damage, which represents 0.05% of 
total annual GDP. When roughly estimated cost of life, independent on the nature of 
attack, stays $4 billion per person, severe terrorist attacks cause annual cost deficit of 
$183 billion (1% of total GDP) and nuclear attacks $465 billion (2% of total GDP) per 
year (Mueller and Stewart 2011). In comparison to other terrorist attacks in Europe, 
the incident in New York, 2001 stands out in regards with the amount of physical 
damage done. Since that terrorism in Europe an U.S. see two other characteristics: 
firstly, the change in nature of terrorist attacks, and secondly the overall impact on 
global economy. The latest trans-national assaults have been larger events with broad 
time interval in U.S. whereas terrorism in Europe has experienced few minor attacks 
Table 9. Approximate financial damage of terrorist attack in U.S. 2011. RAND 2011.
Moderate attack Severe attack Nuclear attack
Cost per year $11 billion $183 billion $465 billion
Cost of life $4 million per person $4 million per person $4 million per person
Cost of injury $40,000 per person $40,000 per person $40,000 per person
Annual resource cost $10 billion $200 billion $300 billion
 % from GDP 0,05% 1% 2%
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over more systematised time frame. The targets in both regions show a connection to 
the global economic centres, which in turn can be argued to be the effect of applying 
counter terrorism measures. 
!
4.1.1 Results of Terrorism on Private Households !
Current studies about direct impacts on terrorist acts on private households show the 
linkage of indirect cause of globalisation and the following need for social protection. 
This results an increase in risks that a country faces to private people through sources 
of outside threats. The promotion of democracy, discussed in the previous chapter is 
supposed to balance capital flows. A sudden threat to a country increases capital and 
financial markets volatility. Especially emerging markets (EM) will have to deal with 
stressed situations for small businesses and unskilled labour. In this case there are two 
outcomes. Firstly, if the job destruction can keep up with creation of new jobs, the 
trade liberalisation and globalisation keep wages on low level. Secondly, when local 
governments respond quickly to new threats, it still limits the possibilities for social 
protection and increased taxes for the employees. In contradiction employees would 
need higher wages to compensate the inconvenience for terrorist attacks in their living 
areas (Frey 2007: 15). !
Most of the recent findings are related to economic impacts to the environment, yet 
the difficulty to estimate single persons utility cost leads academics to estimate the 
willingness to pay for security per individual income. Frey and Luechinger (2004: 
509-515) calculated an estimated sum of how much residents in Northern Ireland 
would pay in order to reduce threat of terrorist attacks to the same level as Great 
Britain (GB). The results showed remarkable outcomes that an average resident in 
Northern Ireland would pay around 41% of his annual income to reduce terrorism in 
that region to the level of GB.  11!
Many economics have researched the change of consumer behaviour due to terrorist 
attacks and whether psychological factors such as fear and happiness have any kind of 
consequence on buying habits. The pre assumption was that mental factors will 
The average annual income per household is $23,721 that is lower than the OECD average of 11
$23,938 per year. The annual household income is calculated according to earnings in 2011, 
after taxes. OECD Better Life Index Organisation, 2015. OECD Better Life Index. [online] Avail-
able at:<http://oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/income/> [Accessed 17 March 2015].
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change behaviour on households level, yet lead to greater consequences on macro 
economic level when all people change their behaviour resulting decrease in labour 
productivity (Naor 2006: 343-359). After terrorist attacks in U.S. consumer demand for 
durable goods increased, because people were loyal to local products (Hughes 2014). 
Other sources assume the buying behaviour to be connected to the possible future 
assaults. By estimating the figures of consumer behaviour in U.S. after 9/11 the fear of 
future terrorist acts have lowered consumption by 0.3% (Keyfitz 2004: 18-23).  12!
Fielding’s (2003: 297-312) investigations about consumption and savings ratio volatility 
due terrorist attacks show, that political tension and violence in Israel for the period of 
1989-1999 decreased consumption over 7%. Furthermore, the amount of savings 
would show a great increase after terrorism would stop due to fear of future attacks 
(Fielding 2003: 309). Yet the newest research using a different methodology for period 
between 1950-2003 show a contrary impact of terrorism attacks on buying behaviour 
in Israel (Eckstein and Tsiddon 2004: 971-1002).  13!
A small amount of economic literature is focussed on overall risk assessment for cities, 
states and regions dealing with fear. Evidence that would show direct causes to 
ordinary citizens are concerned more about how past events had an positive or 
negative effect on economic indicators. Even when terrorism has an direct impact on 
private households it is more likely that it would cause only a certain level of risk and 
fear of future events (Downes-Le Guin and Hoffmann 1993: 19; Becker and Rubinstein, 
2004: 1-65). !
4.1.2 The Footprint of Terrorism on International Commerce !
Most of the key findings in terrorism attacks to local businesses are linked to 
unpredictability and direct economical damage to business activity. In addition, 
 According to Trading Economics, consumer spending in U.S. increased 1,45% from $8376.3 12
billion second quarter 2001 to $8499.8 billion by the end of 2001. Trading Economics, 2015. 
United States Consumer Spending in 1950-2015. [online] Available at:<http://www.tradinge-
conomics.com/united-states/consumer-spending> [Accessed 17 March 2015].
 For the study they used value at Risk (VAR) methodology, which takes into account the prob13 -
ability of losing assets. VAR takes into account three measures: time period, confidence level 
and a percentage of loss. Investopedia, LLC., 2015. An Introduction to Value at Risk (VAR). 
[online] Available at:<http://www.investopedia.com/articles/04/092904.asp> [Accessed 19 
March 2015].
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businesses can suffer from the consequence of not being the actual target. In that 
case the nature of terrorist attack plays a greater role due to variable damage costs. 
According to U.S. Department of State (In Michel-Kerjan and Pedell 2007: 61-75), local 
companies were damaged over 80% of total attacks in 2000 and approximately 90% a 
year after in 2001. Companies are affected by terrorism in two reasons; firstly, through 
logistics and supply chain networking. By sourcing, operating and producing in high 
terrorism risk countries or doing business on international level, increases the chances 
of being targeted. And secondly, due the substitution effects of terrorist targets, 
instead of targeting governmental institutions, extremist groups attack less secured 
companies that have trade connections with the target country. !
While direct damage such as loss of property or machinery have an impact on local 
businesses, statistics have shown that in normal circumstances companies have high 
likelihood to recover quickly (Enders and Sandler 2004: 119). Indirect damage is 
related more to risk of future operations and investors credibility. Moreover, companies 
value in stock markets is somewhat affected by falling capital assets and on the 
possible following companies assets volatility. !
Terrorism harms most frequently tourism, investment and insurance sector. The current 
studies about terrorism and the tourism sector is more concentrated on demand and 
preferences in destinations. Terrorist attacks in the 70’s (Munich Olympic games) , 14
80’s (bombings in Beirut, London and Paris) and 90’s (the Gulf War and killings in 
Luxor, Egypt)  were limited to a region, thereby tourists simply avoided these 15
destinations. Sunstein (2003: 3, 121-136) observes that people are mostly concerned 
about the possible outcome, than the probability it might occur. !
Despite the terrorist risk factor to tourism, the industry will grow rapidly caused by 
increase in disposable income, facilitate travel restrictions and successful tourism 
promotions by governments. According to the World Travel and Tourism Council (2014) 
the forecast for travel industry seems extremely promising with growth rates of over 
4% annually for the next ten years. This growth demands from local governments not 
 Palestinian terrorists attacking Munich Olympic games in 1972. TIME Magazine, 2014. Terror 14
at the olympics: Munich, 1972. [online] Available at:<http://life.time.com/history/munich-mas-
sacre-1972-olympics-photos/#1> [Accessed 18 March 2015].
 More detailed information about the first and second Persian Gulf War. A+E Networks, 2015. 15
Persian Gulf War. [online] Available at:<http://www.history.com/topics/persian-gulf-war> [Ac-
cessed 18 March 2015].
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only to create national security for citizens and tourists, but also an attractive foreign 
trade investment environment for businesses and infrastructure. The transport sector, 
that belongs under tourism sector, has been additionally under direct terrorist 
objective. Attacks on transportation, that counts aviation, maritime transport, road and 
railways, will probably postpone delivery schedules for a limited timeframe. !
The value of government spending depends mostly on FDI, which increases economic 
growth and the wealth of local citizens. Enders and Sandler (1996: 331-352) 
demonstrate the negative impact on capital flows of terrorism with applying VAR 
methodology to Spain and Greece. During 1976 to 1991 both countries suffered under 
terrorism: Apostolic Anti Communist Alliance (AAA) in Spain and Revolutionary Popular 
Struggle in Greece (Jongman 1988: 660-661). For this period terrorism was responsible 
for 13,5% reduction of annual FDI which accounted for $500 million in Spain. Greece 
had an negative impact of 11,9% decrease in FDI and a loss of $400 million, according 
to Enders et al. (1996: 352). !
A large and most important topic about terrorism effects on local businesses is threat 
to insurance sector. Before the major terrorist attacks occurred in 2001 and onwards, 
insurance companies in U.S. had terrorism included to their portfolio because the level 
of risk was thought to be too low (Insurance Information Institute 2015). After 2001 
terrorism raised to be a frequent topic of national security, the insurance issuers 
reassessed risk factors. As a result, terrorism was excluded from their threats list 
creating a situation of adverse selection — only people with most risk were insured 
(Insurance Information Institute 2015). In practice, after 2001 the insurance 
companies realised increasing threat of terrorism and raised insurance premiums 
between 50% to 100%, especially on transportation companies (Walkenhorst and Dihel 
2002). In addition, they demanded government intervention in frames of Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act (TRIA)  and attracting attention of authorities as in some cases 16
terrorism needs public intervention in order to support market forces, rather than 
regulation policies (Brown et al. 2004: 861-898; Chalk 2005: 28-30). !
 U.S. National Association of Insurance Commissioners secure terrorism insurance availability 16
and affordability. Currently extended to December 31, 2020. National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, 2015. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA). [online] Available at:<http://www.-
naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_tria.htm> [Accessed 18 March 2015].
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Stock markets show health of economy or possible future gains of a business, thereby 
terrorist attacks affect stock prices in two ways: first, the expected future profits will be 
less when security measures increase the cost of production, while changing consumer 
behaviour is related to lower future gains. Secondly, companies carry more risk due to 
uncertainty about performance on the market even when stock prices already reflect a 
certain percentage of risk. The most analysed terrorist act in history is the WTC crash 
in U.S. (Table 10), which was also the single event that showed statistical negative 
abnormal effects on stock markets (Chen and Siems 2004: 349-366). !
[Table 10 HERE in Appendix 2 (a)] !
The direct damage from AQI suicide bombers was the closure of New York financial 
markets for six days and 74% increase in loss of life in financial industry of the total 
civilians during WTC attack (Lacker 2004: 935-965). The worlds largest custodian and 
settlement bank The Bank of New York and J.P. Morgan Chase, which is responsible for 
clearing government securities had to switch to manual processing of payment 
transactions, leading to major delays and increased uncertainty in trade and liquidity 
(International Monetary Fund 2001). Additionally New York Stock Exchange saw an 
decrease by 17% for Dow Jones Industrial Average  in September 2001. According to 17
IMF, Standard and Poor’s 500 index (S&P 500)  fell by 11.6%, between September 17 18
and September 21, 2001 (Table 11) and NASDAQ index by 16.1% (NASDAQ Composite 
in Google Finance Beta 2015). !
[Table 11 HERE in Appendix 2 (b)] !
As the effects turned out to be temporary the markets regained the insecurities they 
lost within a week. Table 11 illustrates the negative peak in investor confidence on 
national and international level, that had short term impact until the markets were 
capable to bounce back to normal conditions after few moths. The current state of S&P 
 The Dow Jones Industrial Average is a price-weighted average of 30 market leading stock in 17
specific industries. It has been widely followed indicator of the Stock market since October1, 
1928. Bloomberg Business, 2015. Dow Jones Industrial Average. [online] Available at:<https://
www.bloomberg.com/quote/INDU:IND> [Accessed 19 March 2015].
 S&P 500 Index is a capitalisation-weighted index of 500 stocks, which measures performance 18
of the broad domestic economy through changes in the aggregate market value of 500 stocks. 
Bloomberg Business, 2015. S&P 500 Index. [online] Available at:<https://www.bloomberg.com/
quote/SPX:IND> [Accessed 19 March 2015].
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500 shows a complete recovery from 9/11 terrorist attacks (Table 12) with closing rate 
of 2,074.82 on March 17, 2015 which is annual increase of 10,41% compared to 
March, 17  2014 (S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC 2015). !
[Table 12 HERE in Appendix 2 (b)] !
Nevertheless, the post 9/11 period was highly rewarding for investments in short and 
long term assets, as Dow Jones Industrial Average index increased around 11% 
between September 2001 and January 2005.  Yet again U.S. stock markets show the 19
high level of flexibility and resilience to exogenous damage in comparison to smaller 
stock markets, for instance on Israeli capital markets (Eldor and Melnick 2004: 
367-386). Terrorist strikes on stock and foreign exchange markets in Israel between 
1990 to 2003 present positive correlation during Palestinian-Israeli conflict only through 
suicide bombings. This is explained by the actuality that investments are not solely 
based on future expectations but also on the expected behaviour of others and societal 
environment (Eldor and Melnick 2004: 367-386). !
4.1.3 Terrorism and the Conflict with Governments !
Government policies structure economic impacts of terrorist attacks, rebuild order and 
confidence in the whole economy and reduce risk factors for possible future events 
through dual function. Predicting possible attacks and in the case of failure and having 
a quick response to the actual terror event. Governments can apply different measures 
before- or after attack, that would consequently restore a stabile environment. Such 
measures can be political, moral or military in nature. For example U.S. expands 
political democratic views to regions which have non-democratic regimes, morally they 
would reject their co-operation with countries that show high risk of terrorism. 
Applying its military power, U.S. can cut of threatened regions for own national 
security. Any kind of sanction applied by the local government leaves opposing country 
a choice of mutual agreement or accepting the outcomes of rejection.  !
 Dow Jones Industrial Average closing rate was 9,605.51 on September 10, 2001 and saw a 19
decline approximately 10% over the next 10 days. On December 31, 2004 the closing rate was 
10,783.01. Google Finance Beta, 2015. Dow Jones Industrial Average historical data. [online] 
Available at:<http://www.google.com/finance/historical?cid=983582&startdate=Sep%2010%2C
% 2 0 2 0 0 1 & e n d d a t e = J a n % 2 0 1 % 2 C
%202005&num=30&ei=M8kKVZncMqKrwAOcloGYCg&start=0> [Accessed 19 March 2015].
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Despite the existence of such measures, the U.S. could not predict and prevent the 
terrorist attack on WTC on September 11. Because of failure the structures of 
interstate relations, security in world politics and public governance had changed. In 
the second half of 2001, UN passed the Security Council Resolution 1373, preventing 
financing of terrorist acts, interfere with finances of persons connected to terrorism 
and cut off suspected terrorism sources from U.S. dollar (UNSC 2001). In the terms of 
developing countries, this document forces them under legislation to adjust counter 
terrorism measures and strategies on national level to the ones of Security Council 
Resolution 1373. In particular, India published the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance in 
2001, which expands the definition of terrorism and applies punishments accordingly to 
Indian citizens who are suspects and reside outside the country. Besides it gives 
broaden rights to government agencies to investigate and penalise individuals under 
terrorism suspicion (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2001). Government authorities in 
Indonesia are being resistant with controversial anti-terrorism bill, that would empower 
national security forces to deal with religious terrorist groups. In addition, since 
February 2010 Indonesia has been co-operating with Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) to combat money laundering and close sources of terrorism funds (Jorisch 
2012). Other Asian countries governments have cooperative agreements about 
information sharing, military allocation and implementation of law adjustments.  !
Countries in the EU have strengthened legislation in terrorism matters since increased 
threat in 2001. For instance the European Commission (EC) accepted the Framework 
Decision on Combating Terrorism in 2001, which gives a new definition to terrorism 
and sets scope on objective and subjective elements in terrorism measures in Europe 
(Council of the European Union, 2002). Canada introduced rather similar Anti-Terrorism 
Act (2001), which describes terrorism, prosecutes and punishes terrorists, facilitates 
the use of electronic surveillances and allows arrest of terrorists according to 
Department of Justice (2001). In U.S. the authorities have issued a series of anti-
terrorism measures, that are revised and adjusted over time (Table 13). !
[Table 13 HERE in Appendix 2 (c)] !
Two other legal measures adopted by the U.S. government in 2001 were USA PATRIOT 
(Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism in Department of Justice 2001) and creation of Office 
of Homeland Security (DHS), that developed national security strategy and protected 
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U.S. from possible future terrorist attacks (DHS 2015). In America the anti-terrorism 
measures not only re-shape national community, they affect basic human rights and 
nature of democratic governance globally. !
4.1.4 Interaction of Counter Terrorism measures with Human Rights !
Under the war on terrorism, policies and measures applied by authorities have 
expanded to various other sectors in public administration. For instance the basic 
human rights concerned from private property to free voice in public are affected by 
counter terrorism legislation. In democratic nations people’s basic rights for protection 
and wellbeing include civil rights, political rights and social rights (Eriksen and 
Weingard 1999). These laws have been shaped through history, changing the definition 
of nation state, government regime and methods of public relations. As a result 
terrorist acts and anti-terrorism policies have an strong conflicting impact on every 
clause of human rights. !
The right to privacy and freedom from state interference belong under civil rights. Anti-
terrorism legislation distresses this by allowing authorities and executives gather 
personal records, monitor internet usage and financial transactions of private persons, 
that are associated with terrorism. USA Patriot act, under Section 213 can investigate 
private physical property as normal criminal investigation, nonetheless without 
allowance of the owner. Furthermore, Section 215 empowers authorities to examine 
American citizens and permanent residents connection to international terrorism with 
the slightest suspicion. Such investigation expands also to illegal substances, tax frauds 
and crimes against government (Dempsey 2001: 2). Likewise in EU, the authorities are 
allowed to collect information from private sources, such as phone calls or Emails. 
Especially the French National Assembly perform intensive investigation and private 
communications monitoring in context of counter terrorism strategies.  !
The broad definition of terrorism has caused opposing outlooks about people’s political 
rights, namely USA Patriot act under Section 802 identifies environmental activism and 
civil disobedience as terrorism. Further in Europe, any act of rebellion against current 
government regime, minority groups or public vandalisation are considered as 
terrorism operations (European Commission 2015). Identical complications in Indonesia 
censure anti-terrorism rules, since local elites use it to remove opposition parties. 
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Authorities in India withhold legal registered protests according to Prevention of 
Terrorism Ordinance, restricting political rights of individuals. When U.S. provided 
military and financial support to developing countries, including Pakistan, Iraq and 
Uzbekistan as national security strategy, Human Rights Watch (HRW) raised an issue 
with the grounds of co-operating with regimes, that practice minority groups inequality 
and strong discrimination against society (HRW 2002). The abuse of minority rights are 
more complicated to prove, nevertheless it occurs in various countries. Major terrorist 
attacks have had a great negative impact on changing the image of Muslim Americans 
and Arab Americas, who formulate a minority group in U.S. The same has happened in 
Russia and China, where individuals with Chechenyan or Muslim roots suffer from 
discrimination to physical attacks. Occasionally people have been isolated from the rest 
of community based on religion or national origin (HRW 2002). The abuse of minority 
rights can also spread out due to globalisation and easy access to social media.  !
Under the pressure of combating terrorism, antiterrorist legislation, institutions and 
national security budgets have indirect impacts on people’s social rights on the price of 
reduced government spending on basic public services. After mayor terrorist attacks in 
2001, the Center for Defence Information (2002) revealed defence budgets for 2003: 
$4 billion boost in Russia, $2.5 billion increase in China, $8.5 billion growth in Saudi 
Arabia and $379 billion in U.S. representing a 14% increase since 2002. The change of 
dividing more funds into national security may cause serious effects especially in low-
income countries, where any kind of spending in military sources reduces budgets for 
education, health care and infrastructure. !
4.2 Case Study: Regime Reform and Rise of Terrorism in Iraq !
„When dictatorship is a fact, revolution is a duty“ 
— Pascal Mercier !
The cause of terrorist activity has risen to become a major threat in national security. 
Violent groupings, such as ISIL, Boko Haram, the Taliban and former AQI have tangled 
Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and most importantly Iraq into conflict over authority 
power, sovereignty and greater territorial aspirations. A rising trend of religious terror 
and extreme interpretations of Wahhabi Islam are said to be the cause of 66% civilians 
death in 2013 in Middle East region. Even though approximately 90% of total 
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population in this region are muslims, religion as a motivation for terrorism has only a 
minor role. In Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Middle East the source of conflict 
and terrorism lies behind more complex political nationalist and separatist movements 
with economical motives. Such form of terrorism has remained constant over the past 
14 years with the change of globalisation challenges. From the early 60’s, two most 
commonly used strategies for counter terrorism purposes were using either policies or 
inducting a new political regime. As Iraq fits perfectly to the frames of emerging 
terrorist groups and the real nature of violence, the leaders and followers theory and 
importance of sovereignty to local minority groups, and finally the effects on counter 
terrorism strategies, the relationship between Iraq and sender countries is thereby the 
topic for this case study. !
4.2.1 Economic Policies in Iraq !
The most powerful party in Iraq history has been the Baath party, which had periodical 
political power, yet remained in control of Bagdad since 1968. In the same year 
Saddam Hussein gained a position in Revolutionary Command Council and started to 
make his way to become head of the state, which he achieved in 1979. Since his 
presidency, Hussein applied dictatorship rules and terror in Iraq to keep the despotic 
rule. Living mostly isolated from the outside world and surrounded only by a 
diminishing circle of trusted advisers, he leads Iraq to bankruptcy. On account of 
Saddam’s rule, economic information were considered state secrets and remained to 
be estimates. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit in U.S. (1990) data, Iraq’s 
GDP was at $38 billion in 1989. From 1990 until 1996, when Saddam Hussein accepted 
the UN Resolution 986 , which resulted a large 30% drop in GDP from the value of 20
1989. For the period 1996 to 2002 Iraqi GDP increased from $10,6 billion in 1996 to 
$33 billion in 2000, nevertheless dropping back to $29 billion in 2001 (CIA 2007).  !
The economic situation of Iraq showed mixed, yet rather negative results. Before 1990 
agriculture and industrial sectors suffered under labor shortages, land reforms and 
collectivisation conflicts, even though both sectors were under governmental control. 
After 1991 economic embargoes on oil and international military coalition changed the 
 UN Resolution 986 allows temporarily the import of Iraqi oil and oil products as a measure to 20
provide humanitarian ait for Iraqi people. United Nation 1995. Resolution 986 (1995). [online] 
Available at:<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/109/88/PDF/N9510988.pdf?
OpenElement> [Accessed 2 April 2014].
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economics in Iraq to the worse. Estimated real GDP fell by nearly two-thirds in 1991 
due to an 85% decline in oil production. Growth in agricultural and manufacturing 
sector stayed on minimal level (Economist Intelligence Unit 1998-99: 14-15. In 
Peterson Institute for International Economics). The UN sponsored embargo reduced 
trade volume and caused a sharp rise in domestic prices. In addition, the Iraqi 
government reacted negatively to UN resolutions and continued to support financially 
military forces and other internal means of security. Distributing most financial assets 
in protection to the political regime, budgets for social welfare and medical aid were 
non-existent. 1996 Iraq agreed with UN oil-for-food program in 13 phases, from 1996 
to 2003, which was an exchange of oil from Iraq to food and medicine needed for local 
people, worth an estimated 25% of real GDP in 1997 (Table 14). !
[Table 14 HERE in Appendix 2 (c)] !
The first oil was exported in December 10, 1996 worth of $2 billion for the first three 
phases. For the phases IV and V the maximum production for $5,2 billion, but with the 
low oil price and political problems, Iraqi government couldn’t reach the target. The 
Security Council’s resolution 1266 in 1999 declared oil scarcity in Iraq. In order to 
prevent future shortages in trade, an additional oil export, worth $3 billion was allowed 
beginning from phase VI. Besides Security Council’s resolution 1284 in 1999 dismissed 
the upper limit on exports in Iraq (UN, Office of Iraq Programme 2003). In 2003 the 
Department of Defence discovered an 48% over valuation of all 759 trading contracts 
with approximately 21%. The highest were food commodity contracts with 87%. In 
some cases the use of intermediary companies increased contract prices 20% or more 
(GAO 2004: 4). The overall economic impact through UN and U.S. sanctions to Iraqi 
economy has been concluded in Table 15. !
[Table 15 HERE in Appendix 2 (d)] !
4.2.2 The New Regime 
!
In 1998, the main crisis point between Iraq and Clinton administration in U.S. was the 
existence and terrorist control over weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The previous 
attempts transform Iraq into democracy through economic sanctioning had not brought 
the expected results, thereby a regime change policy, the Iraq Liberation Act was 
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accepted in 1998 and launched in March 2003, which allowed U.S. military troops enter 
Iraq. Bush administration stated, that this was the main goal of war on terror, 
moreover to expand democratic views to other nations in Middle East region. Iraq has 
been independent since 1932 and under the rule of Heshemite dynasty from 
1921-1958, although experienced parliamentary elections in 1920-1932, during the 
period of British rule.  !
The 33,42 million population of Iraq consist of 99% muslims (65% Shi’ite and 32% 
Sunni muslims) and 2% of other religious minority groups, such as christians. The 
religious and political conflicts between Shi’ite and Sunni groups have been a reason 
for domestic terrorism. Since the start of Iraq war in 2003, smaller communities fled 
the country because of fear that without dictatorship rule the minorities would be the 
direct target for Shi’ite muslims. As Saddam Hussein belonged to the Baath party, a 
secular government, other minorities felt safe.  !
Despite the violent domestic conflicts in 2005, Iraq votes for its first full term 
government and giving the majority control of parliament to Shi’ites party, who named 
Nouri al-Maliki as Prime Minister in 2006. The voting results caused another link in the 
conflict with Sunni extremists protests against the regime. By that time Iraqi civilian 
deaths peak about 3500 in July 2006. After Saddam Hussein’s execution in December 
2006, another 20,000 U.S. troops enter Iraqi capital Bagdad to maintain national 
security against terrorist attacks and violent protests. In 2007 the local military 
nevertheless needs support from GB and U.S. to control Iraqis second largest city 
Basara, that is ruled by terrorists and criminal gangs. Not until 2009 the country gains 
some independence, when the parliament passes provincial elections law and U.S. 
military hands over security responsibilities in Anbar, the countries most rebellious 
province. In 2009 U.S. army troops start to leave Iraq with the goal of having no  more 
presence by 2011. The next parliamentary elections in 2010 were held already under 
domestic forces, yet dozens of explosions in Bagdad and other cities held voters rate 
over 62% from total population. Compared to the 75% voters rate in 2005 the citizens 
are under threat of terror and doubts of democracy. After nine months of political 
struggle, the Iraqi government approves a coalition government lead by prime minister 
al-Maliki’s State of Law party. Thirty four ministers hold the cabinet with mixed 
politicians from Sunni and Shi’ite oppositions for conflict situations. The heads of 
defence and interior ministry remain unpointed with interim power to al-Maliki and 
increased concern about authority centralisation.  
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The statistics show a great impact on domestic economic development through 
disturbed political situation in various periods starting from 1988. With the population 
of 17,2 million in 1988 the GDP per capita results $64,4 billion. In spite of that the 
period of war and unease let the population grow constantly and it reaches 21,1 million 
in 1997. Iraq’s GDP drops down to $15,4billion, which is 23,9% less than in 1988. The 
impose of foreign embargoes has an direct impact on gross indicators, decreasing 
Iraq’s GDP growth rate by 30% in 1988 and over a 9 year period 78% in 1977. The 
nearly 50% fall of GDP per capita from  $1,903 to $566  leaves local people with very 
poor living standards (Table 16). !
[Table 16 HERE in Appendix 2 (e)] !
Despite the political conflicts and trade embargoes Iraq has managed to improve the 
state situation by 2014. In the late 80’s and early 90’s the main trading partners of Iraq 
were neighbouring countries, such as Iran and Jordan. Regardless of economic 
sanctions, U.S. was the leading export partner with 21,2% of total trade, whereby 
European countries, in particular Italy and Spain, accounted for nearly 9% of total 
export (Table 16). The sender countries remain important destinations for export in 
mineral products, chemical goods, foodstuffs and machinery (Table 17). Most 
substantial import products for Iraq remain foodstuffs, chemical products, plastics and 
rubbers. Trade information between Iraq and Iran is partially missing or incomplete 
since concerns about security and societal stability. !
[Table 17 HERE in Appendix 2 (e)] 
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Conclusion !
Terrorism has come a long way through modernisation and development to be 
converted into one of the main issues in national and international security. As 
analysed throughout this thesis, the methods taken against terrorism have not always 
been the most effective regarding the real debate, otherwise there wouldn’t be any 
clashes with minority groups, global violence and default state building in less 
developed countries. Because of anti-terrorism measures have a spill-over effect to 
sectors of public administration and non-targeted audience, it is important to 
understand the primary motivations and causes of terrorism.  !
Alternative theories, such as leader-follower theory distinguished firstly between 
autocratic and democratic regimes. Arguing, that people in countries, with fragile 
politics, absent legal frameworks for national security and government-promoted 
violence, tend to fight for own benefits applying an extent of violence. Thereby having 
a rational reason for obtaining protection against the state itself. In such environments 
terrorist group’s leaders maximise possibilities for the end goal and to stay in power. 
Along with followers, who try to obtain sovereignty through adopting the ideology of 
the leader. Furthermore foreign military interference has increased the level of 
terrorism, due to local’s belief, that using army forces is in charge of absent basic 
human rights. !
Most contemporary anti-terrorism strategies use military power based on international 
legislation, allowance of engagement, laws to protect and pursue intelligence units and 
exclusion of human rights among others. Even-though such strategies can have direct 
and indirect effect on terrorism, the results are mostly short-term and influence further 
sectors of international economy. The slight positive correlation between terrorism and 
government regime shows, that using force as a counter-terrorism strategy should be 
rather an alternative choice, after using more peaceful options. Besides recent practice 
demonstrates, that fragile political stability and weak state legitimacy under autocratic 
regime increases the risk of state failure and emergence of terrorist groups. Drawing a 
link between the nature of terrorism and regime type indicates, that states vulnerable 
to terrorism would need a nexus of industrial and political measures, such as 
promoting foreign direct investment, principles of free trade, protecting human rights 
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regime would probably hinder terrorism and push economic development, yet a further 
extensive study is needed to investigate reasons that put an end to terrorism. !
Extreme terrorist attacks have direct and indirect effect on micro- and macro levels, as 
described in the second part of this thesis. One of the major and most memorable 
assault in 2001, started an era of new anti-terrorism legislation. Despite the 
outstanding damage on private property, financial- and capital markets, global 
commerce and increased risk on individuals, it is essential to understand the scope of 
terrorism. The current definition assigns various illegal action under the same law, 
which sets limitations not only on free public activity, but goes into conflict with basic 
human rights. As a paradox, violence and insecurity are the reasons for economic 
vulnerability, and any kind of economic downturn can cause violence and insecurity on 
national level. In most countries, that are prone to violence and inequality, face the risk 
of terrorism. Thereby applying force and certain counter terrorism methods will never 
guarantee a total success or failure, due to the direct- and indirect damage to both 
parties. The spillover effect and incomplete risk assessment caused by information 
asymmetry would favour the nation, that along with other factors considers public 
concern, differences in authority regimes, free market policies and international 
legislation for the counter-terrorism strategies matrix. !!!!!!!!
!!!
!!
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Table 3. Roles and Types within Terrorist Hierarchies. Victoroff 2012.
Sponsor Leader Executive Committee
State Authority Figure Self-imagined Idealist Political Policy Maker
Substate Group Sponsor Self-imagined Messianic Military Policy Maker
Individual Financial 
Contributor
Ethnic or Religious 
animus driven
Entrepreneur
Middle Management Follower Lone Wolf
Strategist/ Technograt Foot Solider/ Action 
Prepetrator
Recruiter Technican
Trainer/ Dispatcher Researcher/ Surveyor/ 
Errand Runner
Supplier/ Armorer Transporter/ Harborer
Sympathizer/ Fellow 
Traveller
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Table 6. Index of Economic Freedom 2015. The Heritage Foundation 2015.
Iraq Afghanistan Pakistan Nigeria Syria United 
States
World 
Average
Rule of Law
Property 
Rights
N/A N/A 30,0 30,0 10,0 80,0 42,2
Freedom for 
Corruption
16,0 8,0 28,8 25,5 17,0 73,0 41,9
Limited Government
Government 
Spending
43,8 81,2 86,1 76,1 N/A 51,8 67,7
Fiscal 
Freedom
N/A 91,7 77,7 85,2 N/A 66,2 77,4
Regulatory Efficiency
Business 
Freedom
57,5 61,4 65,6 48,3 57,3 88,8 64,1
Labor 
Freedom
74,4 67,5 42,1 77,7 49,1 98,5 61,3
Monetary 
Freedom
73,6 72,1 71,2 N/A 70,4 76,6 75,0
Open Markets
Trade 
Freedom
N/A N/A 65,5 63,8 N/A 87,0 74,5
Investment 
freedom
N/A 55,0 50,0 40,0 0,0 70,0 54,8
Financial 
Freedom
N/A N/A 40,0 40,0 20,0 70,0 48,5
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table 7. Main- and control variables. Piazza, J. A., International Politics Journal, 2008.
Variable Operation
Terrorism Incidents Total number of terrorist attacks originating in a country 1986-2003 
(State Department).
Democracy Variable 
(FH)
Average of political rights and civil liberties indexes for each country 
1986-2003 (Freedom House 2004).
Democracy Variable 
(Polity IV)
The degree of autocracy or democracy in the country 1986-2003 
(Marshall, M. G. and Jaggers, K., 2011).
Economic Freedom 
(Heritage Foundation)
Average Index of Economic Freedom 1995-2003 (Heritage 
Foundation).
Economic Freedom 
(EFW)
Average Index of Economic Freedom additional periods 1985, 1990, 
1995, 2000 and 2001 (Economic Freedom of the World, 2003).
Human Development 
Index
Average Human Development Index 1986-2003 per coutry (United 
Nations Development Program).
Population National Population per country 1986-2003 (Ibid.).
Total National 
Geographic Area
Geographic surface area per country 2000 (Ibid.).
Regime Durability Number of regime changes per country 1986-2003 from indicator of 
Polity IV database (Marshall, M. G. and Jaggers, K., 2011).
Repression Capacity 
Index
[(Total Armed Forces in 1,000s)*(Total Military Budget in $billion)] / 
[(Population in millions)*(Geographic Surface Area in millions of 
square kilometers)] (Piazza 2008).
State Failures Number of state failures per country 1986-2003.
Muslim Population Control variable (CIA World Fact-book).
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Table 8. Political Freedom and Terrorism, 1986-2003. Piazza, J. A., International Politics Journal 
2008.
Variable 1 2 3 4
Democracy Variable (FH) 0.245 
(0.154)
0.288 
(0.135)
Democracy Variable (Polity IV) 0.065 
(0.035)
0.070 
(0.032)
Economic Freedom (Heritage 
Foundation)
-0.002 
(0.014)
0.002 
(0.012)
Economic Freedom (EFW) -0.191 
(0.169)
-0.132 
(0.159)
Human Development Index -0.000 
(0.001)
0.000 
(0.001)
-0.000 
(0.001)
0.000 
(0.001)
Population 0.485 
(0.147)**
0.506 
(0.148)**
0.474 
(0.146)**
0.494 
(0.149)**
Total National Geographic Area -0.048 
(0.135)
-0.055 
(0.134)
-0.063 
(0.134)
-0.070 
(0.134)
Regime Durability -0.118 
(0.173)
-0.125 
(0.171)
-0.144 
(0.165)
-0.162 
(0.166)
Repression Capacity Index 0.000 
(0.000)
0.000 
(0.000)
0.000 
(0.000)
0.000 
(0.000)
State Failures 0.119 
(0.026)***
0.111 
(0.026)**
0.116 
(0.027)**
*
0.107 
(0.027)***
Muslim Population 0.923 
(0.392)*
0.982 
(0.360)**
0.962 
(0.388)*
0.977 
(0.366)**
Constant 1.480 
(1.406)
2.059 
(1.606)
2.266 
(1.454)
2.937 
(1.669)
*** Indicates significance at 0.000 level; ** indicates significance at 0.01 level; *indicates 
significance at 0.05 level.
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Table 10. Twenty most costly terrorist acts by insured property losses. Insurance Information 
Institute 2013.
Rank Date Country Location Insured property loss 
($millions)
Fatalaties
1 Sep. 11, 2001 U.S. New York, 
Washington 
DC.
24,721 2982
2 Apr. 24, 1993 U.K. London 1,193 1
3 Jun. 15, 1996 U.K. Manchester 980 0
4 Apr. 10, 1992 U.K. London 883 3
5 Feb. 26, 1993 U.S. New York 822 6
6 Jul. 24, 2001 Sri Lanka Colombo 525 20
7 Feb. 9, 1996 U.K. London 341 2
8 Jun. 23, 1985 North Atlantic Irish Sea 212 329
9 Apr 19, 1995 U.S. Oklahoma 
City, OK
192 166
10 Sep. 12, 
1970
Jordan Zerqa, 
Dawsosn’s 
Field
167 0
11 Sep. 6, 1970 Egypt Cairo 145 0
12 Apr. 11, 1992 U.K. London 127 0
13 Nov. 26, 2008 India Mumbai 111 172
14 Mar. 27, 1993 Germany Weiterstadt 93 0
15 Dec. 30, 2006 Spain Madrid 76 2
16 Dec. 21, 1988 U.K. Lockerbie 74 270
17 Jul. 25, 1983 Sri Lanka 62 0
18 Jul. 7, 2005 U.K. London 62 52
19 Nov. 23, 1996 Comoros Indian Ocean 60 127
20 Mar. 17, 1992 Argentina Buenos Aires 50 24
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Table 11. Standard and Poor’s 500 Index. European Central Bank 2001.
Date Open High Low Close Volume
Oct 1,2001 1,040.20 1,040.20 1,026.76 1,038.55 -
Sep 28, 2001 1,019.73 1,040.94 1,019.73 1,040.94 -
Sep 27, 2001 1,006.29 1,018.92 998.24 1,018.61 -
Sep 26, 2001 1,013.53 1,020.29 1,002.62 1,007.04 -
Sep 25, 2001 1,003.88 1,017.14 998.33 1,012.27 -
Sep 24, 2001 969.73 1,008.44 969.73 1,003.45 -
Sep 21, 2001 975.98 984.54 944.75 965.80 -
Sep 20, 2001 1,012.98 1,012.98 984.49 984.54 -
Sep 19, 2001 1,032.74 1,038.91 984.62 1,016.10 -
Sep 18, 2001 1,040.08 1,046.42 1,029.25 1,032.74 -
Sep 17, 2001 1,037.75 1,056.55 1,037.60 1,038.77 -
Sep 11, 2001 1,092.54 1,092.54 1,092.54 1,092.54 -
Sep 10, 2001 1,084.49 1,096.94 1,073.15 1,092.54 -
Table 12. Standard and Poor’s 500 Index. European Central Bank 2015.
Date Open High Low Close Volume
Mar 17, 2015 2,080.59 2,080.59 2,065.08 2,074.28 475,714,134
Mar 16, 2015 2,055.35 2,081.41 2,055.35 2,081.19 541,612,324
Mar 13, 2015 2,064.56 2,064.56 2,041.17 2,053.40 553,445,667
Mar 12, 2015 2,041.10 2,066.41 2,041.10 2,065.95 541,588,132
Mar 11, 2015 2,044.69 2,050.08 2,039.69 2,040.24 540,138,591
Mar 10, 2015 2,076.14 2,076.14 2,044.16 2,044.16 618,042,903
Mar 9, 2015 2,072.25 2,083.49 2,072.21 2,079.43 491,672,606
Mar 6, 2015 2,100.91 2,100.91 2,067.27 2,071.26 654,413,604
Mar 5, 2015 2,098.54 2,104.25 2,095.22 2,101.04 479,611,957
Mar 4, 2015 2,107.72 2,107.72 2,087.62 2,098.53 489,025,555
Mar 3, 2015 2,115.76 2,115.76 2,098.26 2,107.78 488,593,539
Mar 2, 2015 2,105.23 2,117.52 2,104.50 2,117.39 516,612,174
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Table 13. U.S. Department of the Treasury. FinCen 2015.
Legisltion Objective
The Financial Anti-
Terrorism Act 2001
New record keeping and government reporting requirements for 
financial institutions and customer financial record.
Airline Security Act 2001 New security standards in all modes of transport.
USA Patriot 2001 To deter and punish terrorist acts in U.S. and globally. To 
enhance law enforcement investigatory tools. 
Bioterrorism 
Preparedness Act 2002
To improve the ability of U.S. prevent, prepare and respond to 
bioterrorism and other public health emergencies.
U.S. Security Act 2012 Sharing financial information concerning securities being offered 
for public sale and prohibiting deceit, misrepresentations and 
other fraud in the sale of securities.
Airport Security 
Enhancement Act 2014
Improved intergovernmental planning and communication during 
security incidents at domestic airports.
Table 14. Oil-for-Food program 1996-2003. UN, Office of Iraq Programme, 2003.
Phase Volume of oil (millions of barrels)
Value of oil exported 
(millions of dollars)
I 120 2,150
II 127 2,125
III 182 2,085
IV 308 3,027
V 360.8 3,947
VI 389.6 7,402
VII 343.4 8,302
VIII 375.7 9,564
IXb 293.0 5,638
X 300.2 5,350
XI 225.9 4,589
XII 232.7 5,639
a. Phases: I: 10 December 1996; II: 8 June 1997; III: 5 December 1997; IV: 30 May 1998; 
V: 26 November 1998; VI: 25 May 1999; VII: 10 December 1999; VIII: 8 June 2000; IX: 5 
December 2000; X: 20 May 2001; XI: 6 December 2001; XII: 30 May 2002; XIII: 5 
December 2002.
b. Beginning with Phase IX Iraq required that payments be made in Euros instead of US 
dollars. Dollar amounts quoted are those reported by UN, Office of Iraq Programme.
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Table 15. Estimated Economic impact through sanctioning on Iraq 1990-2003. Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, 2015.
Phase I: 1990-96  
Boycott of Iraqi oil; welfare loss estimated at 90% of value of lost oil sales $13,6 billion
Suspension of US agricultural export credits; estimated at 25% of loan value. $250 million
Embargo on exports to Iraq; welfare loss estimated at 50% of lost shipments 
(based on value of 1988 Iraqi imports)
$4,6 billion
Freeze of Iraqi assets; welfare loss estimated at 10% of face value of assets 
frozen. 
$370 million
Total, 1990-96 $18,8 billion
  
Phase II: 1997-2003
Boycott of Iraqi oil; welfare loss estimated at 90% of value of lost oil sales $11,3 billion
Suspension of US agricultural export credits; estimated at 25% of loan value. $250 million
Embargo on exports to Iraq; welfare loss estimated at 50% of lost shipments $4,6 billion
Freeze of Iraqi assets; welfare loss estimated at 10% of face value of assets 
frozen.
$370 million
Offset Oil-for-food program; welfare gain estimated at 53% of average Iraqi oil 
revenues for 1997-98 [Phase I to IV]
$-2,5 billion
Gains from smuggling of oil and surcharge on oil-for-food trade; welfare gains 
calculated at 100% of estimated revenues.
$-2 billion
Total, 1997-2003 $12 billion
Average Annual Total, 1990-2003 $15,4 billion
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Table 17. Iraqs export and import with sender countries. Observatory of Economic complexity, 
2015.
Total Export 
2012 
Export value and % Total Import 
2012
Import value and %
Algeria $115.000 Grapes 94,93% $110.000; 
Paper goods 5,07% $5.843
$78.3 million Raw sugar 99,95% 
$78.3 million; 
Vegetables 0,5%
Iran N/A N/A N/A N/A
Jordan $188 million Mineral products 83,99% 
$160 million; Chemical 
products $27.9 million 
14,45%; Paper goods, 
Textiles, Machines 14,5%; 
Others 1,51%
$1.21 billion Chemical Products 
19,09% $230 million; 
Machines 14,01% 
$169 million; 
Foodstuffs 12,07% 
$153 million; 
Vegetable Products 
11,30% $136 million; 
Plastics and Rubbers 
11,07% $134 million; 
Others 32,46% $392,8 
million
Libya N/A N/A N/A N/A
Yemen $1.04 million Tropical Fruits 100,0% 
$1.04 million
$5.74 million Foodstuffs 99,18% 
$5.69 million; Animal 
Products 0,75% 
$43.200; Paper goods 
0,07% $3.890
Table 16. Iraqs statistics in 1988 and 1997. IMF 1997 in Peterson Institute for International 
Economics 2015.
Gross indicators of Iraqi economy 1988 1997 2014
Iraqi GDP $64,4 billion $15,4 billion $222,88 billion
Population in Iraq 17,2 million 21,2 million 35,9 million
Annual effect of sanctions to gross indicators
% of GDP 30% 78% N/A
Per capita $1,093 $566 N/A
Iraqi trade with sender countries Total trade
Exports (1989) 97% $91.99 million
Imports (1989) 98% $66.61 million
a. Sender countries include Algeria, Iran, Jordan, Libya, and Yemen.
b. Export partners U.S. 21,1%; India 20,2%; China 13,6%; South-Korea 11%; Canada 4,7%; 
Italy 4,4%; Spain 4,2% 
Import partners: Turkey 27,5%; Syria 16,2%; China 12,5%; U.S. 5,2%; South-Korea 4,7%
